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Abstract
We study learning of predicate logics formulas from “elementary facts,” i.e. from the values of the predicates in the given model.
Several models of learning are considered, but most of our attention is paid to learning with belief levels. We propose an axiom
system which describes what we consider to be a human scientist’s natural behavior when trying to explore these elementary facts.
It is proved that no such system can be complete. However we believe that our axiom system is “practically” complete. Theorems
presented in the paper in some sense confirm our hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
When E.M. Gold wrote his seminal paper [15], it was the starting point of a new area of research. Since then it
was assumed that the main problem in the algorithmic learning theory is to restore a grammar from samples of the
language, or a program from its sample computations. However scientists working in physics or biology have become
accustomed to searching for interesting assertions rather than for a universal theory explaining everything. Following
their example we consider in this paper how to find out nontrivial assertions from particular observations.
Two questions arise:
(1) What language can be used for these assertions.
(2) How to perform the learning process.
Since this is only one of the first papers on learning assertions from elementary facts, we restrict ourselves to
the first-order predicate logics [18] as the language for the assertions. This language is rich enough for nontrivial
assertions, and, on the other hand, it is also universal enough, it does not use specific properties of particular languages.
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model) was started in [3–5,19].
The second question, how to perform the learning process, is a bit more complicated. A practitioner would demand
finiteness of the learning process. The result would be produced after a finite number of computation steps. In contrast
to this approach we are less interested in constructing practical learning algorithms, and we are more interested in
understanding how such a learning process is performed by brain. Hence, we are ready to allow infinite learning
process as well.
E.M. Gold [15] has already considered an infinite learning process when studying “identification of functions in the
limit.” We say that the inductive inference machine (IIM) identifies a function in the limit, if reading more and more
input-output values f (a) = b, f (c) = d, . . . , the IIM produces a sequence of hypotheses p0,p1,p2, . . . about the
program computing the function f , and this sequence has a limit being a correct program for f . Gold-style learning
of formulas in the limit is also considered in our paper. However, our attention is concentrated to another type of
infinite learning process.
In the paper [2] a new type of inductive inference “learning with confidence” (or “learning with belief levels”)
was considered. In some sense this notion is closer to the human inference process. When we produce any hypothesis
based on a finite number of observations we are tended to estimate some belief level of our hypothesis. Thus, we come
to a natural inductive inference type “learning with belief levels from elementary facts.” This inductive inference type
is central in our paper.
We start with considering how to learn recursive functions [22] with belief levels. After that we come to a natural
inductive inference type “learning first-order predicate logic formulas with belief levels from elementary facts.” By
“elementary facts” we understand values of the given predicates for specific values of the arguments. Our main results
concern axiomatization of learning formulas with belief levels.
Why do we believe in the great importance of the axiomatizability problem? The aim of axiomatization is to find
the basic elements of which our practical everyday reasoning is constructed. At first it seems that inductive inference
and axiomatization are incompatible notions because axiomatization traditionally is considered as a prerogative of
deductive systems. However inductive inference processes (learning from examples) performed by distinct persons
show great similarity. This prompts the existence of objective regularities in the inductive inference. On the other
hand, axiomatization of inductive inference presumes search for objective regularities. It is evident that axioms of
inductive inference should differ from axioms of deductive systems, because the latter serve for deducing absolute
truth while the former are only hypotheses with higher or less high belief level.
Technically, axiomatization naturally introduces nondeterministic algorithms. In any axiom system there is never
an algorithm which axiom is supposed to be used at the moment. This is always a nondeterministic choice.
We have discovered that nondeterminism, plus usage of belief levels may produce better computational power
rather than nondeterminism, plus computation in the limit. We prove below (Theorems 5 and 6) that many more func-
tions can be computed nondeterministically with belief levels rather than nondeterministically in the limit. Theorem 7
shows the same effect for learning functions. Theorem 15 shows a similar effect for learning predicate logic formulas.
Nevertheless, axiomatization is not merely a usage of nondeterministic algorithms. We would like to note that we
have not been able to axiomatize the possibilities of identifiability in the limit. It seems that one of the reasons for this
difficulty is the remoteness of identification type from the natural human inference. On the other hand, we have no
doubt about the naturality of the learning with belief levels.
Finally, in Section 9 we discover that our axiom system is not complete. This may be considered as a serious
defect. Yet, there are many famous incomplete axiom systems in mathematics. Remember the axioms of Euclidean
geometry, axioms of first-order predicate logics (in these cases a complete axiomatization was achieved), axioms
of Peano arithmetics, Zermelo–Fraenkel axiom system for the set theory. These systems are incomplete, and they
cannot be made complete (by Gödel incompleteness theorem [13]). But this does not challenge the importance of this
axiomatization. For instance, when we speak of Peano axiom system [20], then all natural assertions in arithmetics
can be proved in Peano arithmetics (not always in a trivial way). On the other hand, all the counterexamples provided
by the proof of the Gödel incompleteness theorem are highly artificial. The same can be said about David Hilbert’s
system of axioms of the elementary geometry [16] and about Zermelo–Fraenkel axiom system for the set theory [23].
We believe that our axiom system (being not complete) still is kind of complete in the following pragmatic sense.
We hope that every true formula which can be deduced in a natural way from the infinite sequence of all elementary
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cannot be proved formally.
2. Belief levels
In this section we consider algorithmic devices that compute by producing a sequence of numbers, each paired
with a belief level. The definitions we give in this section will be used in subsequent sections to discuss computation
combined with belief levels, learning with associated belief levels and a notion of proof joined with a belief level.
This section contains the definitions and discussion that are shared by each of these three topics. In all cases we
are concerned with processes that produce outputs. The interpretation of these outputs will determine whether a
computation, a learning episode, or a proof is discussed.
A belief level is a rational number between 0 and 1. Intuitively, a 0 indicates no confidence in the answer and a
1 indicates certainty. As our confidence concerning the answer may vary over time, the processes we consider will
produce a sequence of outputs, each paired with a belief level indicating the measure of certainty about the result. Such
an output sequence of such pairs might look like: y0/e0, y1/e1, y2/e2, . . . . We interpret these outputs as the value yi
with the belief level ei . The yi ’s are not necessarily distinct. In fact, for a given value y there may be infinitely many
i such that y = yi . In the case of a computation, the process producing the output sequence is algorithmic, and it
is driven by a single input, e.g. the argument to the computation. Here the yi ’s in the output sequence are natural
numbers from the range of the function being computed. For the learning case, the output producing process is again
algorithmic, but it is driven by a potentially infinite input sequence, e.g. the examples, or a training set, for the learning
algorithm.
The sequence y0/e0, y1/e1, y2/e2, . . . can be finite or infinite. We say that the sequence y0/e0, y1/e1, y2/e2, . . .




In general no monotonicity is demanded in the sequence y0/e0, y1/e1, y2/e2, . . . . However in all proofs in this
paper we use only monotone sequences of belief level, i.e. sequences such that en  en+1 for all n. Moreover, in all
our results below the belief levels can be taken from a predetermined standard list, e.g.
en = 1 − 12n .
3. Computing with belief levels
This section contains our first application of belief level sequences. For the simplest case, we consider a traditional
computation, augmented by self calculated belief levels. In this model the result of the computation becomes apparent
only when the belief level for some potential result has reached 1. This event may not occur in any finite number of
steps. A more natural name might be “limit computability,” but there is already a well studied notion of that name. In
fact, we show that our notion of computing with belief levels is different from limit computability. After defining the
basic notions and giving some preliminary results we consider variations of our definition by relaxing the conditions
for convergence of the belief sequence.
A function g is called limit computable if there is a computable function f such that, for any value x,g(x) =
limt→∞ f (x, t) [14]. By the limit lemma [7,14], the limit computable functions are precisely those functions f that
are Turing reducible to the halting problem.
3.1. Deterministic computing functions with belief levels
We start our discussion with definitions of analogues of computable relations and functions.
Definition 1. A relation R is computable with belief levels if there is an algorithm that on any input x produces an
output sequence of pairs of a natural number y and belief s = y0/e0, y1/e1, y2/e2, . . . , such that the output sequence is
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corresponding to this y converges to 1.
Definition 2. A function f is computable with belief levels iff the relation (x, f (x)) is computable with belief levels.
Theorem 1. For any total function f , if f is limit computable, then f is computable with belief levels.
Proof. Suppose f is limit computable. Then there is a recursive function h such that for any x, limt→∞ h(x, t) =
f (x). The desired algorithm, on input x, outputs h(x, t) with belief levels 1 − 1/2t for t = 0,1, . . . . Let s be the
sequence of outputs so produced. The E(s,f (x)) monotonically approaches 1. Furthermore, for any y = f (x) that is
produced as a conjectured output by the algorithm, there is a largest t such that h(x, t)= y. Hence, E(s, y) converges
to 1 − 1/2t . 
If the converse of Theorem 1 were also true, then the notion of recursiveness with belief levels would coin-
cide precisely with the well studied notion of limit computability. However, as we will show, this is not the case.
A consequence of the following discussion is that our new notion of computability with belief levels, despite several
similarities, is distinct from the limit computability. In fact, by considering partial recursive functions, we will see that
the two notions are incomparable. Our results rely on the notion of the graph of a function. For a partial function ψ ,
the graph of ψ (denoted by Gψ ) is the set of ordered pairs (x,ψ(x)) as x ranges over the domain of ψ . We continue
with a characterization of computing with belief levels.
We use the arithmetical hierarchy of sets for this characterization. An excellent description of this hierarchy and of
the analytical hierarchy of sets used in the next subsection can be found in [21].
By definition, a set A is in Σ2 if there is recursive, {0,1}-valued function g such that:
x ∈A ⇔ ∃y∀z[g(x, y, z)= 1].
It is convenient for us to use also an alternate characterization given by Kreisel, Shoenfield and Wang and presented
as Theorem 4-XVIII in [21].
Theorem 2. If A ∈Σ2, then there is a recursive {0,1}-valued function h such that:
x ∈A ⇔ ∃t ′∀t > t ′[h(x, t)= 1],
x /∈A ⇔ ∀t ′∃t > t ′[h(x, t)= 0].
By definition, a set A is in Π2 iff A is in Σ2.
Theorem 3. A function ψ is computable with belief levels iff Gψ ∈Π2.
Proof. Let ψ be an arbitrary partial recursive function. Recall that Gψ ∈ Π2 iff there is a total recursive function f
such that
(x,u) ∈Gφ ⇔ (∀y)(∃t)
[
f (x,u, y, t)= 1].
Suppose that Gψ is computable with belief levels via algorithm A. We will show the existence of a recursive function
f that will place Gψ ∈Π2 via the above relation. Define:
f (x,u, y, t)=
{
1, if A on input x outputs u with belief level at least 1 − 1/2y in at most t steps;
0, otherwise.
Clearly, f is recursive and it suffices to show that Gψ ∈ Π2. Suppose that Gψ ∈ Π2. Let f be the recursive function
of four arguments that is guaranteed to exist by the characterization of Π2 above. To complete the proof, we must
describe the operation of an algorithm that inductively computes ψ . This algorithm, on input x, will output u with
belief level 1 − 1/2y if and only if a t is found such that f (x,u, y′, t) = 1 for all y′  y. The search for such a t is
accomplished via dovetailing. Hence, if s is the sequence of outputs produced by the above algorithm on input x, then
the belief level monotonically approaches 1 iff ψ(x)= u. 
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Theorem 4. (See R. Freivalds and K. Podnieks [6], in English see [8].) A function ψ is limit computable iff Gψ ∈Σ2.
3.2. Nondeterministic computing functions with belief levels
One of the traditional ways to relax the definition of computation is to consider nondeterministic computing agents.
For completeness and comparison with our previous definition relaxation, we now consider the possibility to allow
the algorithms that generate the belief sequences to be nondeterministic, giving rise nondeterministic computability
with belief levels. Again, we will provide characterizations of what can be computed in terms of hierarchies based on
traditional computation. To make the comparisons similar to those of the previous subsection, we use the analytical
hierarchy. The analytical hierarchy is similar to the arithmetic hierarchy save for quantification over sets instead of
integers [21]. Notationally, a superscript of 1 is used to differentiate the two hierarchies. Following the notation from
[21] upper case letters are used for set variables and lower case letters for natural number valued variables. The main
result about the analytical hierarchy that we use is given by the following lemma which is also known as exercise
16–10 from [21].
Lemma 1. For any n > 0, any set of integers in Σ1n can be expressed by a predicate with a prefix of n+ 2 alternating
quantifiers, starting with an existential quantifier, the first n of which are over sets and the last two over natural
numbers.
For technical reasons, it is convenient to represent a nondeterministic machine as a deterministic one with a separate
input tape for the nondeterministic choices. A run of a nondeterministic algorithm will be precisely determined by
the input x and the choice tape. Since any nondeterministic algorithm can make only finitely many choices at any
given time instance, we can without loss of generality assume that there are only 2 possibilities to choose from at any
moment. Hence, the choice tape uses an alphabet of {0,1}. Associated with this tape is a set S such that i ∈ S iff a 1
appears in the ith square of the reserved input tape.
Theorem 5. A function ψ is nondeterministically computable with belief levels iff Gψ ∈Σ11 .
Proof. Suppose that ψ is nondeterministically computable with belief levels via a nondeterministic algorithm A. Let
s be the sequence of outputs produced by the computation of A on input x using choice set S. The sequence E(s,u)
monotonically converges to 1 iff (x,u) ∈ Gψ . Let P be the predicate that is true just in case the algorithm A after
t steps on input x with choice set S has produced conjecture u with belief level at least 1 − 1/2y . Notice that P is
recursive in t , x, S, u and y. Hence,
(x,u) ∈Gψ ⇔ ∃S∀y∃t
[
P(t, x, S,u, y)
]
is precisely a Σ11 description of Gψ . Suppose that Gψ ∈Σ11 . By Lemma 1, there is a recursive predicate R such that





Using Theorem 2 this can be rewritten as




for another recursive predicate Q. We now describe the behavior of a nondeterministic algorithm A on input x using
a choice set S. A operates in effective stages t  0 described below.
Begin stage t . For each u  t , let y be the cardinality of {t ′  t | Q(S,x,u, y, t ′)} and output u with belief level
1 − 1/2y .
End staget .
The proof is completed by the observation that for an arbitrary choice set S for which A produces output sequence
s on input x, E(s,u) converges to 1 iff ∀t ′∃t > t ′Q(S,x,u, y, t). 
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Theorem 6. (See R. Freivalds and K. Podnieks [6], in English see [10].) A function ψ is nondeterministically limit
computable iff ψ is limit computable iff Gψ ∈Σ2.
This comparison shows that nondeterminism provides a huge advantage of computation with belief levels over limit
computation. The same type advantage is proved below for learning functions and learning formulas.
4. Learning functions with belief levels
The notion of computability with belief levels introduced in Section 3 has the character of producing the value of
a function in the limit. In this sense it is reminiscent of learning in the limit where a correct program is determined in
the limit based on examples of the intended input/output behavior. We review the basic notions of learning in the limit
before proceeding to introduce an ostensibly new variant that incorporates the idea that one should be more confident
of answer over time as the limit is approached.
Gold in his seminal paper [15], defined the notion called identification in the limit. This definition concerned
learning by algorithmic devices now called inductive inference machines (IIMs). An IIM inputs the range of a recursive
function, an ordered pair at a time and while doing so outputs computer programs. In this paper we will only discuss
the inference of (total) recursive functions. We will assume, without loss of generality, that the input is received by
an IIM in its natural domain increasing order, f (0), f (1), . . . . An IIM, on input from a function f , will output a
potentially infinite sequence of programs p0,p1, . . . . The IIM converges if either the sequence is finite, say of length
n+1, or there is a program p such that for all but finitely many i, pi = p. In the former case we say the IIM converges
to pn, and in the latter case, to p. In general, there is no effective way to tell when, and if, an IIM has converged.
When speaking about programs we are to remember that the identification power of IIMs depends very much on
the programming language used, or equivalently, on the used numbering of partial recursive functions. Copying [9]
and [11] we use the following definitions.
Definition 3. We say that {Ψi}∞i=0 is a computable numbering of PR if there is 2-argument partial recursive function
U(n,x) such that:
(1) for arbitrary n, Ψn(x)=U(n,x) for all x;
(2) for arbitrary 1-argument partial recursive function Ψ there is a natural number m such that U(m,x) = Ψ (x) for
all x.
Definition 4. We say that a numbering {Ψi}∞i=0 of PR is reducible to the numbering {Υi}∞i=0 of PR if there is a total
recursive function f such that for arbitrary i, x there holds Ψi(x)= Υf (i)(x).
Definition 5. We say that a computable numbering {Υi}∞i=0 of PR is a Gödel numbering if every computable {Ψi}∞i=0
of PR is reducible to Υf (i)(x).
Definition 6. We say that a Gödel numbering {Υi}∞i=0 of PR is Friedberg numbering if for arbitrary natural numbers i
and j , i = j implies Ψi and Ψj are distinct functions.
The existence of Friedberg numberings was proved in [12].
Following Gold we say that an IIM M identifies a function f if, when M is given the graph of f as input, it
converges to a program p that computes f . If an IIM identifies some function f , then some form of learning must
have taken place, since, by the properties of convergence, only finitely much of the graph of f was known by the
IIM at the (unknown) point of convergence. Each IIM will learn some set of recursive functions. The collection of all
such sets over the universe of effective algorithms viewed as IIMs serves as a characterization of the learning power
inherent in the Gold model. This collection is symbolically denoted by EX (for explanation).
Now we will describe learning with belief levels. A Belief inductive inference machine (BIIM) works like an IIM,
except that it outputs a sequence of hypothesis with belief levels: s = p0/e0,p1/e1,p2/e2, . . . . We say that a BIIM M
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for any pi , the belief levels sequence is monotone and there exists a unique p with the belief levels of p approaching
1 and ϕp = f . In this way, each BIIM learns a set of recursive functions. The collection of all such sets is denoted by
BEX.
Theorem 7. The class  of all 1-argument total recursive functions is BEX-identifiable.
Proof. We will describe the operation of a BIIM M as it tries to learn a recursive function f . The basic idea is for
M to run an enumeration technique [1,15] on a Friedberg numbering [12] of the partial recursive functions. More
formally, let ψ0,ψ1, . . . be a Friedberg numbering, i.e. a listing of all and only the partial recursive functions such
that if i = j then ψi = ψj . Then there is a recursive function h mapping the Friedberg indices to standard indices.
Formally, ψi = ϕh(i), for all i. M operates in stages described as follows.
Begin Stage t . Input the datum f (t) so that all the values of f |t are now known. For each j  t , simulate the
computation of ψj (x) for t steps. For each j  t , let aj , the length of agreement, be the largest number such that
(1) aj  t and
(2) ψj (x) converges in at most t steps for all x  aj , and
(3) ψj (x)= f (x) for all x  aj .
M outputs program h(j) with belief level 1 − 1/2aj , for each j  t .
End Stage t .
Since ψ0,ψ1, . . . is a Friedberg numbering, there is a unique j such that ψj = f . Let s be the sequence of output
pairs produced by M on input from the graph of f . Since ψj = f , program h(j) is the output at all stages t  j .
Furthermore, E(s,h(j)) is a monotonically nondecreasing sequence that approaches 1. Let k be any number such
that k = j . Then ψk = ψj = f . Choose the least x such that ψk(x) = f (x). Then, for stages t  k, the value ak < x.
Hence, E(s,h(k)) does not approach 1. Consequently, M converges in the correct sense to h(j) and so learns f. 
5. Learning formulas from elementary facts
We start with necessary logical concepts. A model will be a triple 〈Σ,N, I 〉 where Σ is a finite set of predicate
symbols, called a signature, with designated arities, N is the domain of the variables used in the predicates and I is
the interpretation of the predicates. Unless otherwise noted, the domain will be the natural numbers, N. For example,
consider the model M0 = 〈Σ0,N, I0〉 where Σ0 contains three binary predicates, P1, P2 and P3. The interpretation I0
is given by three formulas: P1(x, y): x  y, P2(x, y): y = 5x and P3(x, y): y = x2. The elementary facts of a model
are all of the instantiated predicate symbols of the model with associated truth values. The elementary facts of our
example model M0 include P1(2,5) = T , P1(6,2) = F , P1(4,5) = T , P2(2,10) = T , P3(3,10) = F . In some of the
proofs that follow it will be more convenient to list these elementary facts as P1(2,5), ¬P1(6,2), P1(4,5), P2(2,10),
¬P3(3,10).
Let M = 〈Σ,N, I 〉 be a model. By EM we denote the set of all elementary facts of the model M . By DM we denote
the set of all enumerations of all elements of EM .
By elementary formulas we understand formulas of type:
P(n1, . . . , nk)
where P is a k-ary predicate symbol from Σ and ni (i = 1, . . . , k) is either variable or a notation for a domain element.
For instance, if P ∈Σ , then P(x, y), P(x,7), P(3,7) are elementary formulas. By formulas we understand first-order
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model such a formula is either true or false.
We are interested in the following problem: given an infinite sequence of all the elementary facts of the model M ,
to find out whether the formula is true or false in the model M .
5.1. Learning formulas in the limit
We start considering formula learning process in the limit which is a counterpart to E.M. Gold’s notion of learning
in the limit.
Definition 7. A limit formula learning machine (abbreviated LFL) is a deterministic algorithmic device that takes
as the input an enumeration of the elementary facts of some model and produces as the output a sequence of the
first-order predicate logics formulas paired with values TRUE and FALSE.
An LFL can output the same formula several times, some instances with TRUE, some instances with FALSE. If L
is LFL and D is its input data and f is a predicate logic formula, then S(L,D,f ) = (a1, a2, . . .) is the sequence of
statements TRUE and FALSE associated with f .
Definition 8. We say that LFL L learns a formula f from the input data D if and only if S(L,D,f ) is either a finite
sequence with the last element TRUE or an infinite sequence with almost all elements TRUE. The set of formulas
produced this way is denoted by L(D).
Definition 9. An LFL L is correct iff for all models M and all D ∈ DM , all the formulas in L(D) are true for the
model M .
Definition 10. We say that LFL L learns formula f iff L learns the formula f from every D ∈DM of every model M
such that f is true in M .
Definition 11. We say that LFL L decides formula f iff L learns both f and ¬f .
Of course, we study learning and deciding of formulas only by correct LFL L.
Theorem 8. Let A be an arbitrary quantifier-free formula with predicate symbols P1, . . . ,Pn from signature Σ , and
x1, . . . , xu, y1, . . . , yv be variables of the involved predicates. Then the formula
∃x1 . . . xu∀y1 . . .∀yv
(
A(P1, . . . ,Pn, x1, . . . , xu, y1, . . . , yv)
)
is learnable by a correct LFL.
Proof. Let α0, α1, α2, . . . be an enumeration of all possible u-tuples of nonnegative integers and β0, β1, β2, . . . be an
enumeration of all possible v-tuples of nonnegative integers. LFL systematically takes u-tuples α0, α1, α2, . . . and for
the current αi outputs FALSE immediately followed by TRUE, goes on in systematic consideration of all v-tuples
until the formula A turns out to be false. Then LFL goes to another u-tuple αi+1. If the formula is true, only a finite
number of outputs related to this formula is output, and the last one is TRUE.Hence the LFL learns the formula If the
formula is false, the sequence of outputs is infinite. Hence the LFL is correct. 
Theorem 9. There is no correct LFL which learns formula “∀x∃y(P (x, y)).”
Proof. Assume from the contrary that this formula (called f for the sequel) is learnable by a correct LFL L. We
construct a predicate PL(x, y) such that the formula ∀x∃y(PL(x, y)) is true but it is not learnable by L.
Consider an effective numbering of all pairs of natural numbers p(i), i = 0,1, . . . . We denote the first component
x of the pair p(i) = (x, y) by x(i). We say that the set of pairs S = {p(s1), . . . , p(se)} x-covers the set of pairs
R = {p(r1), . . . , p(rm)} if {x(s1), . . . , x(se)} ⊇ {x(r1), . . . , x(rm)}. We define the predicate PL stepwise.
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Step 2i. Make PL(p(n2i−1 + 1)), . . . ,PL(p(n2i−1 + 2)), . . . ,PL(p(n2i )) true until
(1) {p(n2i−1 + 1),p(n2i−1 + 2), . . . , p(n2i )} x-covers {p(0),p(1), . . . , p(n2i−1)}, and
(2) L outputs TRUE for ∀x∃y(P (x, y)).
Step 2i + 1. Make PL(p(n2i + 1)),PL(p(n2i + 2)), . . . ,PL(p(n2i+1)) false until L outputs FALSE for
∀x∃y(P (x, y)).
Since L learns f , the above mentioned mind changes at the moments n1, n2, n3, . . . exist, and the definition of PL
is correct. It follows from the definition of PL that the formula ∀x∃y(PL(x, y)) is true. However, L makes infinitely
many mind changes. 
Corollary 10. The formula “∃x∀y(P (x, y))” is learnable, but not decidable by an LFL.
Definition 12. A correct LFL L is called best iff L′(D)⊆ L(D) holds for arbitrary correct LFL L′, for arbitrary model
M and arbitrary enumeration of elementary facts D ∈DM .
Theorem 11. There is no best LFL.
Proof. Assume from the contrary that a best LFL exists. Denote this LFL by L. Consider the formula
“∀x∃y(P (x, y)).” Let U denote the set of all the interpretations of the predicate P(x, y) such that ∀x∃y(P (x, y))
is true and L learns ∀x∃y(P (x, y)) at these interpretations. It follows from Theorem 9 that U does not include all the
interpretations of P(x, y) for which ∀x∃y(P (x, y)) is true.
Construct a predicate PL(x, y) by the method described in the proof of Theorem 9. Evidently PL(x, y) is an
interpretation not in U but ∀x∃y(PL(x, y)) is true. It is easy to see from the consideration of the construction of
PL(x, y) that there is an algorithm (depending on L) to compute the values of PL(x, y). This implies the existence of
a computable function GL(x) such that ∀xPL(x,GL(x)) is true. By using the function GL(x), it is easy to construct
a correct LFL L′ learning ∀x∃y(P (x, y)) at the interpretation PL(x, y). Hence, there is an interpretation for which L
does not learn a formula, but another LFL L′ does the job. Contradiction with the assumption L being a best LFL. 
Theorem 12. If f is a first-order predicate logics formula involving only monadic predicates, then f is decidable by
correct LFL.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the target formula f is in prenex form. We proceed by induction.
For formulas without quantifiers the theorem is obvious. Assume that the theorem is true for n− 1 quantifiers and the
target formula f contains n quantifiers.
Let Qx be the outermost quantifier of the formula f . Suppose that P1, . . . ,Pm is a complete list of all monadic
predicates in f which contain the variable x. To simplify the proof assume that m = 2. The generalization to larger
values of m is obvious. We define 4 formulas f1, f2, f3, f4 (in general 2m formulas) derived from f substituting,
respectively, P1(x)= T , P2(x)= T for f1, P1(x)= T , P2(x)= F for f2, P1(x)= F , P2(x)= T for f3, P1(x)= F ,




)∨ (P1(x)∧ ¬P2(x)∧ f2)∨ (¬P1(x)∧ P2(x)∧ f3)∨ (¬P1(x)∧ ¬P2(x)∧ f4)).
By the induction assumption there are LFLs L1, L2, L3, L4 deciding f1, f2, f3, f4 respectively. If Qx is the existential
quantifier ∃x, the machine L finds out in the limit which of the four formulas g1: ∃x(P1(x)∧P2(x)), g2: ∃x(P1(x)∧
¬P2(x)), g3: ∃x(¬P1(x)∧P2(x)), g4: ∃x(¬P1(x)∧¬P2(x)) are true in the model M . These formulas are decidable
by LFL K1, K2, K3 and K4. In parallel L outputs the disjunction of the outputs of all the machines L1, L2, L3 and
L4 with the corresponding indices.
If Qx is the universal quantifier ∀x, the machine L finds out in the limit which of the four machines L1, L2, L3,
L4 output TRUE (this subset stabilizes in the limit), reacting to every mind change by outputting the sequence TRUE,
FALSE, and outputs the disjunction of the outputs of all the machines K1, K2, K3 and K4 with the corresponding
indices. 
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Now we consider another learning process which is essentially infinite. The machine attaches to each output a
belief level. For some formula the belief level may grow while for some other formula the belief level stabilizes at
some intermediate level.
Definition 13. Belief formula learning machine (abbreviated BFL) is a deterministic algorithmic device that takes as
the input an enumeration of the elementary facts of some model and produces as the output an infinite sequence of
first-order predicate logic formulas paired with belief levels.
A BFL will produce a sequence of outputs, where the same formula may appear over and over again, with different
belief levels. If B is BFL and D is its input data and f is a predicate logic formula, then Z(B,D,f )= (b1, b2, . . .) is
the sequence of belief levels associated with f that B produces when given D as input, in the order of appearance in
the output stream.
Definition 14. We say that a BFL B learns a formula f from the input data D if and only if Z(B,D,f ) monotonically
converges to 1. The set of formulas produced this way is denoted by B(D).
Definition 15. A BFL B is correct iff for all models M and all D ∈ DM , all the formulas in B(D) are true for the
model M .
Definition 16. We say that a BFL L learns formula f iff B learns formula f from every D ∈ DM of every model M
such that f is true in M .
For instance, the formula ∀x(P (x)) is learnable by a correct BFL. Indeed, let ω(n)= 1/2n+1. If BFL finds out that
P(0) ∧ P(1) ∧ · · · ∧ P(n) is true, BFL outputs the formula ∀x(P (x)) with belief level Σni=0ω(i). Hence, the BFL
learns ∀x(P (x)) iff it is true for the considered model.
Definition 17. We say that a BFL B decides formula f iff B learns both f and ¬f .
Theorem 13. Let A be an arbitrary quantifier-free formula with predicate symbols P1, . . . ,Pn from signature Σ , and
x1, . . . , xu, y1, . . . , yv be variables of the involved predicates. Then the formula
∀x1, . . . ,∀xu,∃y1, . . . ,∃yvA(P1, . . . ,Pk, x1, . . . , xu, y1, . . . , yv)
is learnable by a correct BFL.
Proof. Let α0, α1, α2, . . . be an enumeration of all possible u-tuples of nonnegative integers and β0, β1, β2, . . . be an
enumeration of all possible v-tuples of nonnegative integers. Let ω(n) = 1 − 1/2n+1. If the BFL finds out that for
u-tuples α0, α1, α2, . . . exists v-tuples βi0, βi1, . . . , βin such that A(P1, . . . ,Pk,α0, βi0),A(P1, . . . ,Pk,α1, βi1), . . . ,
A(P1, . . . ,Pk,αn,βin) are true, then the BFL outputs the formula ∀x1, . . . ,∀xu,∃y1, . . . ,∃yvA(P1, . . . ,Pk, x1, . . . , xu,
y1, . . . , yv) with belief level Σni=0ω(i). Hence, the BFL learns this formula iff the formula is true for the considered
model. 
Theorem 14. There is no correct BFL which learns formula “∃x∀y(P (x, y)).”
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that a BFL L learns f = ∃x∀y(P (x, y)). We construct, in effective stages of
finite extension, an interpretation for the predicate P(x, y) such that L outputs f with belief levels converging to 1,
but the formula f is not true under this interpretation of the predicate. Each stage s will employ an auxiliary predicate
Ps that is defined prior this stage, and ∃x∀y(Ps(x, y)) is true. By way of initialization, P0 is the predicate over two
arguments that is always true. We define an increasing sequence of integers ms to mark boundaries of areas where P
is equal to Ps . The first integer m0 is defined to be 0. Execute the following stages for s = 0, s = 1, . . . .
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T , if (x, y) ∈Ds ;
T , if x >ms+1;
F, otherwise.
End stages.
Define P(x, y)= Ps(x, y) for ms−1 < x ms , s = 1,2, . . . Notice that P coincides with Ps on all the values used
by L to produce f/e with some e 1 − 1/2s . Hence, when the values of P are used as the elementary facts for L, L
will produce belief levels for f converging to 1. In other words, L learns f . However, for an arbitrary x, and for all
sufficiently large y’s, P(x, y)= F . Hence f is false for this interpretation of P , a contradiction. 
Theorem 15. If a formula is decidable by LFL, then it is decidable by BFL as well.
Proof. Since the formula f is decidable by LFL L, the outputs concerning f stabilize on TRUE or FALSE. Hence
the correct answer is the current output at infinitely many points, while the incorrect answer is the current output at
only finitely often. Hence the BFL can raise expectation level for the current output of the LFL. 
Theorem 16. If f is a first-order predicate logic formula involving only monadic predicates, then f is decidable by
BFL.
Proof. Immediately from Theorems 12 and 15. 
Definition 18. A correct BFL B is called best iff B ′(D)⊆ B(D) holds for an arbitrary correct BFL B ′, for an arbitrary
model M and an arbitrary enumeration of elementary facts D ∈DM .
Theorem 17. There is no best BFL.
Proof. The proof starts by the construction of a sequence of BFLs B0,B1,B2, . . . . The idea is to make each of
the BFLs behave correctly and in particular the following property holds for any model M and any enumeration of
elementary facts D ∈DM , Z(Bi,D,∃x∀yP (x, y)) monotonically approaches 1 iff ∀y(P (i, y)) is true in M .
The machine Bi is really quite simple. Whenever it finds elementary facts P(i,0) = T ,P (i,1) = T , . . . ,
P (i, n)= T , the machine outputs the formula ∃x∀yP (x, y) with belief level Σni=0ω(i) where ω(i)= 1/2i+1.
Choose any model M for which ∃x∀yP (x, y) is true. Then, in the model M , ∀yP (i, y) is true for some i. Hence
BFL Bi learns this formula for model M .
Suppose by way of contradiction that B is the best BFL. Then it covers BFL’s B0,B1,B2, . . . . Hence B learns the
formula ∃x∀yP (x, y) for every model M . A contradiction to Theorem 14. 
6. A logic of discovery
This section is the central one in our paper. We will study the axiomatization of learning formulas with belief levels.
We start with introducing a new notion
A/e
where A is a formula and e is a rational number with 0 e 1. We call the number e the belief level of the formula A.
The intuitive meaning of the belief level e is that, based on the prior steps of the proof, we have belief e that the formula
A is true.
To formulate the new axioms we need one more notion, namely, that of weighting function




For example, let ω(n)= 1/2n. The idea of the weighting function is that some examples are more relevant than the
others. The weighting function will be used to determine the belief level of a universally quantified sentence, based
on known examples.
Our proof system starts with a standard first-order theory (see, e.g., [17]). Proofs are built in the standard fashion.
We allowed to write A as a line of a proof if A can be deduced by the usual axioms from prior lines in the proof, or
we have been given that A is true as an input to the discovery process.




This axiom merely says that if A is provable within the standard first-order theory, then A is provable with belief 1
in our system.
We continue by adding to the standard set of axioms for the first-order theory the following e-axiom or belief axiom
for a formula A with one free variable:
A(n1)/e1, . . . ,A(nk)/ek
∀xA(x)/∑ki=1 ω(ni) · ei .
Intuitively, if we have reasoned that A is true on some examples (the ni ’s), then we have some belief that (∀x)A(x) is
true and this belief is proportional to the number of examples and the confidence that we have in those examples. In
our examples below we use the t-axiom so that all of the ei ’s associated with the ni ’s are 1. If in some lines of a proof
we have A(2) and then later A(4), we would be able to use the e-axiom to obtain (∀x)A(x)/e where e = ω(2)+ω(4).
Sometimes, in our proof system, we may derive a formula A with some belief e and then, from A derive B , using
only traditional logic. We would like the belief of A to convey to B , but some care must be taken in doing so. To
describe the conveyance, we first must define a notion of syntactic complexity for formulas.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, below by formulas we understand formulas in prenex form.
Definition 20. Formula A is no more complex than B (written A B) iff
(1) A has no more quantifiers than B , and
(2) A has no more constants than B , i.e. there is no constant which is used in A, but not used in B .
For example, consider formulas
A1: ∀x∀y∃z∃u
(





It is easy to see that A1 A2, A2 A1, A3 A1, A3 A2, but it is not the case that A1 A3, A2 A3.
Please notice that our definition of  ignores the names of the bounded variables.
We now introduce the c-axiom, or conveyance axiom. Let A ⇒ B denote the situation where B follows from A in
the traditional first-order logic.
A/e,A⇒ B and A B
B/e
.
Definition 21. We say that A/e is e-provable in the model M iff starting from elementary facts of model M and using
traditional first-order theory argumented with the c-axiom, the e-axiom and the t-axiom we can obtain A/e.
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A(1) elementary fact (input),
∃xA(x) 1, traditional logic,
A(1)/1 1, t-axiom,
∀xA(x)/.25 3, e-axiom,
A(3) elementary fact (input),
A(3)/1 5, t-axiom,
∀xA(x)/.3125 3, 6, e-axiom,
∀xA(x) ⇒ ∀x∀y(A(x)∨B(y)) traditional logic,
∀x∀y(A(x)∨B(y))/3125 7, 8, c-axiom.
Definition 22. We say that A is e-provable in the model M iff for every  > 0 there is an e  1 −  such that A/e is
e-provable in the model M .
Definition 23. We say that the axiom system Ω is sound for formula learning with belief levels iff every formula
which is e-provable in the model M by Ω is true in the model M .
Theorem 18. The traditional first-order logic plus the e-axiom, the c-axiom and the t-axiom is sound.
Proof. Our formulas are in prenex form. The quantifierless body of the formula is a Boolean propositional formula
made of terms being predicate symbols from the finite signature Σ with constants and variable symbols.
Consider, for instance, two formulas
A= ∀x∃y(P(x,7, y) ⇒ Q(y,5)),
B = ∀x∃y(Q(y,5)∨ ¬P(x,7, y)).
They have the same quantifier prefix (with equal names for the bounded variables) and the quantifierless bodies are
equivalent Boolean formulas of the same variables P(x,7, y) and Q(y,5). It is easy to conjecture that A is e-provable
in a model M if and only if B is e-provable in M . To prove such a conjecture we consider the notion of reversible
equivalence.
Definition 24. We say that formulas A and B are reversibly equivalent (A ≡rev B) if they have the same quantifier
prefix (with equal names for the bound variables) and the quantifier less bodies are equivalent Boolean formulas of
the same variables.
Definition 25. We say that formulas A and B are equivalent up to names (A≡rename B) if they differ only in the names
of the bounded variables.
Definition 26. We say that formulas A and B are generalized reversibly equivalent (A ≡grev B) in the model M , if
there is a formula C such that A≡rev C, and C ≡rename B .
Lemma 2. If in M one can e-prove A/e, and A≡grev B , then one can also e-prove B/e in M .
Proof. A ≡grev B implies A ⇒ B in traditional logic, and A B . Hence, by the c-axiom, B/e is e-provable in M if
A/e is e-provable in M . 
Let the formula A be ∀xF(x), and let Π be an e-proof of A/e. The last axiom used in proof Π can be either
t-axiom or c-axiom or e-axiom. If the last axiom is e-axiom, then we say that A/e is obtained by direct using of
e-axiom.
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Proof. Let a be arbitrary constant. Obviously, F(a) and G(a) are also generalized reversible equivalent. According
to Lemma 2, F(a)/e is e-provable in M iff G(a)/e is e-provable in M . From this follows our lemma. 
Lemma 4. For an arbitrary formula B , there are only a finite number (up to generalized reversible equivalence) of
formulas A such that A B .
Proof. Let S be the set of the constants used in B . There is only a finite number of different Boolean formulas made
of terms consisting of predicate symbols from the finite set Σ , the bounded variables used in B and the constants
from S. 
We complete the proof of the theorem by showing that for an arbitrary formula B which is false in the model M ,
and for an arbitrary weighting system ω, there is a real number e0 < 1 such that e-proofs of B/e in M cannot exist for
e > e0. We proceed by induction over k, the number of quantifiers used in B .
The base case (k = 0) is when B has no quantifiers, so e-proofs are also first-order proofs.
Suppose inductively that for any formula A with at most k quantifiers which is false in the model M , there is a real
number e0 < 1 such that there are no e-proofs of A/e in M for any e > e0. Suppose further that B is a formula with
k + 1 quantifiers that is false in the model M , and we can e-prove B/e in M for arbitrarily high e < 1.
Consider all possible ways how to e-prove B/e. For e < 1 the t-axiom cannot be used. If the leading quantifier of B
is ∃, then the e-axiom cannot be used. Suppose the leading quantifier is ∀ and B is the formula ∀xF(x). Since B is false
by assumption, there must be an a such that F(a) is false. F has exactly k quantifiers, so by the induction hypothesis,
F(a) cannot be proved with arbitrarily high expectation values. This will prevent the e-axiom from producing B/e
with an arbitrarily large e < 1.
Let us pass over to c-axiom. Consider all the A such that A  B . Such A are possible candidates for usage in
c-axiom to obtain B/e. One of three cases applies:
Case 1. A is true in M . Then, in M , there is no first-order proof of A ⇒ B . Hence, c-axiom is not applicable in this
case.
Case 2. A is false in M and A has at most k quantifiers. Then, by the induction hypothesis, one cannot e-prove A/e1
with arbitrarily high values of e1. By Lemma 4 there are only a finite number of different (up to generalized reversible
equivalence) formulas A. By Lemma 2, generalized reversible equivalent formulas are e-provable only up to the same
belief level e. Hence there is a real number e0 < 1 such that e-proofs of A/e in M cannot exist for e > e0. Hence such
A cannot be used in c-axiom to obtain B/e with arbitrarily high e.
Case 3. A is false in M , and A has exactly k + 1 quantifiers (this is the largest possible number of quantifiers for any
formula A  B). By Lemma 4 there are only a finite number of different (up to generalized reversible equivalence)
such formulas A. Therefore, to prove by c-axiom B/e for an arbitrary high value of e, at least one of these A must
be with similar feature, namely, it must be possible to prove A/e for an arbitrarily high value of e. It is easy to see
that c-axiom does not produce new belief levels, it only transfers these e values from one formula to another formula.
The only axiom which produces new belief levels is e-axiom. This axiom works only for formulas A with leading
quantifier ∀. As A is false, then using reasoning similar to the previous case (when leading quantifier of B was ∀),
we conclude that there exists A < 1 such that it is not possible to prove with e-axiom A/e for e > A. According to
Lemma 3 the same refers to all formulas which are generalized reversible equivalent to A. As there are only a finite
number of different (up to generalized reversible equivalence) such formulas A, it means that (by Lemma 4) there
exists 0 < 1 such that for all A there are eA  0. From this follows that we cannot prove with c-axiom B/e for
e > 0. 
Theorem 19. Suppose ω1 and ω2 are two different weighting functions. Then, for any formula A, A is e-provable with
respect to ω1 iff A is e-provable with respect to ω2.
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only the e-axiom, then it is obvious that if A is e-provable with respect to one weight function, then it is e-provable
with respect to any other weight function.
The case when the proof of formula A/e uses also the c-axiom is more complicated. For the sake of simplicity
let as assume that the c-axiom is used only in the final stage of proof of A/e (in the general case, if A is of form
∀xB(x), the c-axiom may have been used also in the proof of B(a)/e). According to the c-axiom, we can transfer
the belief level e along the sequence of implications A1 ⇒ A2 ⇒ ·· · ⇒ An, if A1 A2  · · ·An, and in the result
we can obtain A/e from A1/e. If we consider this sequence of implications from the very beginning, then A1/e, if
e < 1, can be obtained only by direct using of e-axiom. Consequently, A1 must be of the form ∀xB1(x). At the same
time, according to Lemma 4, there are only a finite number (up to generalized reversible equivalence) of formulas Ai
such that Ai  A. Since A is e-provable, then it follows that there must be at least one (up to generalized reversible
equivalence) A1 = ∀xB1(x) such that A1  A, A1 ⇒ A, and for this A1 by direct using of e-axiom a sequence of
assertions A1/e1,A1/e2, . . . ,A1/en, . . . can be proven, where en → 1 when n → ∞. Hence, by c-axiom it follows
that A/e1,A/e2, . . . ,A/en, . . . . However, if for A1 = ∀xB1(x) by direct using of e-axiom a sequence of assertions
A1/e1,A1/e2, . . . ,A1/en, . . . where en → 1 when n → ∞ can be proved with respect to one weight function, then
similar assertions, obviously, can be proved for any other weight function. Consequently, if we can e-prove the formula
A with respect to one weight function, then we can e-prove A with respect to any other weighting function. 
7. Justification of the new axioms
The three new axioms we introduced above, with the exception of (technically needed) Definition 20, are natural
enough, but are they presented here in the most concise form? The t-axiom is the least controversial. It merely takes
truths from the traditional domain and maps them to statements with the highest possible expectation of truth in our
logic of discovery. The e-axiom provides a way of calculating a belief level, modulo a weighting system, based on
prior discoveries. Notice that the use of the e-axiom is the only way to generate a belief level less than 1. The c-axiom
is a form of Modus Ponens. Contrary to traditional Modus Ponens, it contains additional condition A B . Perhaps a
simpler version (without this additional condition) might suffice? To show that nothing obviously simpler will suffice,
we consider the ramifications of some tempting simpler schemes. For the sake of discussion, consider the following




We denote this version as c1-axiom.
Theorem 20. Traditional first-order logic plus t-axiom, the e-axiom and the c1-axiom is NOT sound.
Proof. We prove that there is a model M and a formula A such that A is false in the model M but nonetheless A is
e-provable in M via this system of axioms.
Indeed, we consider a model M with one unary predicate P(x) such that P(1) is true and P(2) is false. We consider
the formula ∀xP (x) which is false in M . Let ω(n) be the weighting function. Our e-axiom provides us ∀xP (x)/ω(1).
We construct a formula Qk being
∀x1∀x2 · · · ∀xk
(
P(x1)∨ P(x2)∨ · · · ∨ P(xk)
)
.
A somewhat similar formula being
∀x1∀x2 · · · ∀xk
(
P(x1)∨ P(x2)∨ · · · ∨ P(xk)
) ⇒ ∀xP (x)
is a tautology in the standard predicate logic. Hence, by t-axiom, it can be e-proved with belief level 1. Using e-axiom




Applying c1-axiom, we get
∀xP (x)/1 − (1 −ω(1))k.
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converging to 1. 
As a consequence of Theorem 20, a straightforward generalization of Modus Ponens fails soundness. We know
from Theorem 18 that imposing some relative complexity constraint on pairs of formulas result in a sound logic. Will
perhaps a simpler version of Definition 20 suffice? We consider dropping the second condition of Definition 20 that
the more complex formula have at least as many distinct constants. We denote the axiom that results from using the
c-axiom, except referring to this relaxed version of relative formula complexity, as c2-axiom.
Theorem 21. Traditional first-order logic plus t-axiom, the e-axiom and the c2-axiom is NOT sound.
Proof. We consider a model M where the binary predicate P(x, y) means “y  x.” In this model the formula
∃x∀yP (x, y) is false. We consider the formula ∀yP (x, y) with one free variable x. Let k be an arbitrary natural
number. Using e-axiom, we can get the belief level
ek = ω(1)+ω(2)+ · · · +ω(k)
for the formula ∀yP (k, y). On the other hand, in the classical logic the formula
∀yP (k, y) ⇒ ∃x∀yP (x, y)
is a tautology. Using c2-axiom with A= ∀yP (k, y) and B = ∃x∀yP (x, y) we get the belief level ek = ω(1)+ω(2)+
· · · + ω(k) for the false formula ∃x∀yP (x, y). Since k → ∞ implies ek → 1, we get belief level converging to 1 for
a false formula ∃x∀yP (x, y). 
8. Power of the axiom system
This section shows that our axiom system is powerful enough to e-prove the same classes of formulas which are
learnable by BFL according Theorems 12 and 13.
Definition 27. We say that formula A is e-provable iff A is e-provable in every model M such that A is true in M .
Theorem 22. Let A be an arbitrary Boolean formula with predicate symbols P1, . . . ,Pn, and x1, . . . , xu, y1, . . . , yv
be variables of the involved predicates. Then the formula
∀x1 · · · ∀xu∃y1 · · · ∃yvA(x1, . . . , yv)
is e-provable.
Proof. We prove here only a special case of this theorem when the formula is ∀x∃yP (x, y) and there is a sequence
{a1, a2, a3, . . .} of natural numbers such that P(1, a1) is true, P(2, a2) is true, etc. The general case is similar and
differs only in more heavy technical notation. The following sequence of proofs is performed via our axiom system.
P(1, a1) elementary fact,
∃yP (1, y) traditional logic,
∃yP (1, y)/1 t-axiom,
∀x∃yP (x, y)/ω(1).1 e-axiom,
P (2, a2) elementary fact,
∃yP (2, y) traditional logic,
∃yP (2, y)/1 t-axiom,
∀x∃yP (x, y)/ω(1).1 +ω(2).1 e-axiom,
P (3, a3) elementary fact,
∃yP (3, y) traditional logic,
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∀x∃yP (x, y)/ω(1)+ω(2)+ω(3) e-axiom,
...
... 
Theorem 23. If A is a first-order predicate logic formula involving only monadic predicates, then A is e-provable.
Proof. Let us remember that we consider only formulas in prenex form. We prove our theorem by induction. For
quantifierless formulas the theorem is obvious. Assume that the theorem is true for k quantifiers and the target formula
F contains k + 1 quantifiers.
Let Qx be the outermost quantifier of the formula F . Suppose that P1, . . . ,Pm is a complete list of all monadic
predicates in F , those which contain the variable x. To simplify the proof, assume that m = 2. The generalization to
larger values of m is obvious. We define 4 formulas f1, f2, f3, f4 (in general 2m formulas) derived from F substituting,
respectively, P1(x)= T , P2(x)= T for f1, P1(x)= T , P2(x)= F for f2, P1(x)= F , P2(x)= T for f3, P1(x)= F ,
P2(x) = F for f4. It is important that f1, f2, f3, f4 have at most k quantifiers. The target formula F is equivalent to
Qx((P1(x) & P2(x) & f1)∨ (P1(x) & ¬P2(x) & f2)∨ (¬P1(x) & P2(x) & f3)∨ (¬P1(x) & ¬P2(x) & f4)).
We consider the cases Q= ∃ and Q= ∀ separately.
Case 1. Assume that F is ∃xG(x), and it is true in the model M for x = 7. Then for x = 7 only one part out of four
(
P1(x) & P2(x) & f1
)
∨ (P1(x) & ¬P2(x) & f2)
∨ (¬P1(x) & P2(x) & f3)
∨ (¬P1(x) & ¬P2(x) & f4)
can be true in M . For instance, let P1(7) & ¬P2(7) & f2 is true in M . This implies that f2 is true in the model M for
all the values of x (because f2 does not contain x). By induction assumption, f2/e is e-provable for arbitrarily high
e < 1. Consider c-axiom with A= f2 and B = ∃xG(x). Since f2 ⇒ ∃xG(x) is true in the model M , and our classical




Hence, by c-axiom, ∃xG(x)/e for an arbitrarily high e < 1.
Case 2. Assume that F is ∀xG(x), and it is true in the model M . It means that for every x separately (e.g., for x = 7)
G(7)≡ [(P1(7) & P2(7) & f1)
∨ (P1(7) & ¬P2(7) & f2)
∨ (¬P1(7) & P2(7) & f3)
∨ (¬P1(7) & ¬P2(7) & f4)]
can be true in M . From this follows that at least one of these 4 parts must be true. If, for instance, the part(
P1(7) & ¬P2(7) & f2
)
is true, then f2 (not containing x) is true, and
f2 ⇒ G(7).
By inductive assumption, f2/e is e-provable in M for arbitrary high e < 1. In the same time
f2 G(7).
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only for 7). Now, using e-axiom, we obtain
G(1)/e1, . . . ,G(k)/ek
(∀x)G(x)/e
where e =∑ki=1 ω(i) · ei → 1 when k → ∞ and ei → 1. 
9. Is this axiom system complete?
There are at least two natural definitions of completeness of axiom systems for formula learning with belief levels.
Definition 28. We say that axiom system Ω is absolutely complete for formula learning with belief levels iff for every
correct BFL L, every model M and every enumeration of elementary facts D ∈DM there holds: if A ∈ L(D), then A
is e-provable by Ω in the model M .
It is easy to see that there do not exist absolutely complete axiom systems for formula proving with belief levels.
Indeed, it is easy to observe that an arbitrary axiom system for formula learning with belief levels can be simulated
by a BFL machine such that the machine learns all the formulas e-provable via this axiom system. An absolutely
complete axiom system would generate a best correct BFL machine which is impossible because of Theorem 17.
Definition 29. We say that axiom system Ω is practically complete for formula learning with belief levels if every
formula which is e-learnable by some BFL, is also e-provable by the axiom system Ω .
We conjecture that our axiom system {traditional logic, t-axiom, e-axiom, c-axiom} is practically complete. Theo-
rems 22 and 23 (compared with Theorems 12 and 13) in a sense support our conjecture. Our conjecture is supported
also by the following theorem:
Theorem 24. If A is e-provable formula and B is e-provable formula, then A∧B is e-provable formula and A∨B is
e-provable formula.
We omit here the proof of this theorem, it is not complicated. Let us mention only that an analog of this theorem
for ¬A and A⇒ B is not valid.
We conclude with an open problem the solution of which would clarify much (if not everything) for the solution
of our conjecture.
Open Problem. Let two formulas A and B be provably equivalent in the classical logic. Let A be e-provable in our
axiom system. Is the other formula B also e-provable in our axiom system?
10. Post scriptum
Carl Smith has been our co-author in 33 published papers. Carl was a very special co-author. He not only produced
theorems but also improved our English and taught the psychology of publishing papers in Western scientific journals.
However, this paper is not merely one of jointly written papers.We started the research represented in this paper
about eight years ago. Carl participated actively, traveled between Maryland and Latvia many times, produced many
versions of axioms, the text of the paper-to-be, examples and counterexamples. His illness was one of the factors why
this project was delayed. Now after his untimely death we feel obliged to fulfill Carl’s dream and bring the paper to
the readers. We miss our friend very much.
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